Postwar Reconstruction
The bellicist theory of statebuilding emphasizes warfare as a driver of statebuilding. However, many states have collapsed after war. My research emphasizes the role of political leadership and how they have to make personnel decisions in state apparatuses to facilitate postwar reconstruction. Increased state capacity after war should not be taken for granted.
State Building after War: Internal Conflicts and the Skill-Based Recruitment of State Agents in Imperial China
I explore state building in the aftermath of war in this paper, enriching the bellicist theory that argues war drives the internal apparatuses of the state. I argue that state builders can establish order by strategically selecting personnel with specific skills and competencies, based on state priorities. During times of peace, the state incorporated elites with legitimacy, while in times of conflict, it relied on individuals with military skills or financial resources. This argument is supported by an original dataset on the appointment of prefects in Imperial China and incidents of conflict. The results indicate a correlation between the appointment of exam-based elites and peace, and the appointment of warriors and office-purchasers with conflict. This paper highlights the critical importance of political order in statehood and the multidimensional nature of competence. It contributes to a deeper understanding of bureaucracy, pre-modern state formation, and state-building.
Ruling after Revolution: Security Challenges and Civilian Control over Military in China, 1949–1976, with Junyan Jiang
In this paper, we turn to the military as a key wielder of violence to examine postwar reconstruction. A monopoly of violence is a key defining feature of modern statehood. In this article, we document how political leaders reestablish order by making personnel decisions when competing incentives are at play Rulers increase group cohesion within the army to conduct effective military operations against sovereignty threats; yet when the sovereignty threat subsides, the control threats impels civilian leadership to diversify military units, especially for higher-level units. Drawing on comprehensive data on personnel and organizational dynamics inside the Chinese military, we illustrate how this tradeoff played out in the post-revolutionary People's Republic of China (1949–1976). We show that (1) the higher level units were more heterogeneous than the lower level units within the military hierarchy, and (2) military units that were involved in combating external enemies were less heterogeneous. These findings highlight the fragile nature of postwar order and the importance of political leadership.
The bellicist theory of statebuilding emphasizes warfare as a driver of statebuilding. However, many states have collapsed after war. My research emphasizes the role of political leadership and how they have to make personnel decisions in state apparatuses to facilitate postwar reconstruction. Increased state capacity after war should not be taken for granted.
State Building after War: Internal Conflicts and the Skill-Based Recruitment of State Agents in Imperial China
I explore state building in the aftermath of war in this paper, enriching the bellicist theory that argues war drives the internal apparatuses of the state. I argue that state builders can establish order by strategically selecting personnel with specific skills and competencies, based on state priorities. During times of peace, the state incorporated elites with legitimacy, while in times of conflict, it relied on individuals with military skills or financial resources. This argument is supported by an original dataset on the appointment of prefects in Imperial China and incidents of conflict. The results indicate a correlation between the appointment of exam-based elites and peace, and the appointment of warriors and office-purchasers with conflict. This paper highlights the critical importance of political order in statehood and the multidimensional nature of competence. It contributes to a deeper understanding of bureaucracy, pre-modern state formation, and state-building.
Ruling after Revolution: Security Challenges and Civilian Control over Military in China, 1949–1976, with Junyan Jiang
In this paper, we turn to the military as a key wielder of violence to examine postwar reconstruction. A monopoly of violence is a key defining feature of modern statehood. In this article, we document how political leaders reestablish order by making personnel decisions when competing incentives are at play Rulers increase group cohesion within the army to conduct effective military operations against sovereignty threats; yet when the sovereignty threat subsides, the control threats impels civilian leadership to diversify military units, especially for higher-level units. Drawing on comprehensive data on personnel and organizational dynamics inside the Chinese military, we illustrate how this tradeoff played out in the post-revolutionary People's Republic of China (1949–1976). We show that (1) the higher level units were more heterogeneous than the lower level units within the military hierarchy, and (2) military units that were involved in combating external enemies were less heterogeneous. These findings highlight the fragile nature of postwar order and the importance of political leadership.
