Research Agenda
Existing theories on state-building emphasize the role of warfare and industrialization. However, these factors are insufficient to explain the trajectories of state building in many countries, such as China. I highlight the role of autocratic elite in state building, and this perspective helps to crystallize the micro-foundations of state building.
Governing the Empire: Meritocracy and Patronage in Imperial China
My dissertation project "Governing the Empire: Meritocracy and Patronage in Imperial China" addresses the puzzle of under what conditions authoritarian leaders use meritocracy and patronage appointments.
Conventional wisdom says autocrats pack bureaucracies with either loyalists or competent officials. However, political survival depends on both governance and coercion. Whereas autocrats use meritocracy to deliver governance, they use patronage appointments for coercion. Therefore perceived conflict risk determines appointment patterns in authoritarian regimes. I construct a dataset of 12,000 prefect appointments within Imperial Chinese bureaucracy from 1644 to 1723. I find that the emperors sent meritocratically-selected officials to interior areas and kept them away from prefectures in which domestic conflicts broke out. This article demonstrates how autocrats balance competence and loyalty in bureaucracy, contributing to regime stability. It also sheds light on our understanding of state building and formal institutions in authoritarian regimes.
Conventional wisdom says autocrats pack bureaucracies with either loyalists or competent officials. However, political survival depends on both governance and coercion. Whereas autocrats use meritocracy to deliver governance, they use patronage appointments for coercion. Therefore perceived conflict risk determines appointment patterns in authoritarian regimes. I construct a dataset of 12,000 prefect appointments within Imperial Chinese bureaucracy from 1644 to 1723. I find that the emperors sent meritocratically-selected officials to interior areas and kept them away from prefectures in which domestic conflicts broke out. This article demonstrates how autocrats balance competence and loyalty in bureaucracy, contributing to regime stability. It also sheds light on our understanding of state building and formal institutions in authoritarian regimes.
Work in Progress
"State building in England", with Pablo Beramendi
"Rebuilding Bureaucracy in Post-Mao China"
"Rebuilding Bureaucracy in Post-Mao China"
